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Summary 
One of the main technologies for renewable power production, offshore wind electricity 
(OWE) is an integral component of decarbonising the European power sector. The costs of 
OWE highly depend on the regulatory frameworks for the provision of wind farms and 
offshore grids. Regarding generation investment, the distribution of decisional 
responsibilities and risks between the generators and the regulator is vital for a cost-
efficient deployment of offshore wind farms (OWF). Targeted OWE instruments which 
offer predictable revenues to generators promise significant advantages over 
decentralised approaches based on the Energy-only market concept. Putting out contracts 
for building and operating OWFs in locations predetermined by the regulator to 
competitive tender, appears to be a suitable approach in many cases. 
A coherent regulatory framework for meshed grid investments must address network 
expansion requirements in a cost-efficient manner. In this context we recommend 
considering four elements: firstly, the harmonisation of the methods for distributing 
connection costs between transmission system operators (TSOs) and OWE generators; 
secondly, sharing network development expenses between the involved TSOs in a 
transparent way; thirdly, similar grid access tariffs for OWE operators; and fourthly, 
establishing a coherent regulatory regime for the TSOs’ cost recovery at the offshore 
meshed grid level. Future regulatory frameworks for offshore meshed grid will require a 
strong engagement of policy makers and regulators. The role of European institutions to 
pave the way to stable and harmonised institutional frameworks is critical. 
This report presents the main findings of three comprehensive working papers developed 
within the scope of Baltic InteGrid (Integrated Baltic Offshore Wind Electricity Grid 
Development), an interdisciplinary Interreg research project, bringing together experts 
from Member States present in the Baltic Sea Region to coordinate the implementation of 
these policy objectives. The goal of the Baltic InteGrid project is to track current regional, 
national, and European energy developments and propose recommendations to optimise 
regulatory frameworks.  
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1. Introduction 
Offshore wind power is a very promising technology for the decarbonisation of energy 
systems. In the past, the levelised costs of electricity (LCOE) from offshore wind farms 
typically exceeded those of the most efficient onshore wind projects.1 This was due to the 
fact that OWE was at a comparatively early stage of development and large experience 
curve effects were yet to be realised. However, the cost of OWE started to significantly 
decrease in the last years. Moreover, OWE offers significant advantages over other 
intermittent RES-E (electricity from renewable energy sources) technologies that are not 
included in LCOE comparisons. For example, plants have more stable production patterns 
which translate into increased electricity production values and lower costs of backup 
capacities. Moreover, offshore locations help avoid land use conflicts as well as negative 
externalities associated with the use of onshore wind power.2 Especially with respect to 
land availability constraints, problems are expected to increase in Europe as countries 
with a high population density are moving towards ambitious RES-E targets. OWE has 
thus the potential to play a major role in future European electricity systems. 
Large-scale deployment of OWE requires significant investments. Therefore it is highly 
important to understand the factors that enable or inhibit OWE investments and to 
identify the best regulatory practices in order to limit the costs of OWE. In principal, this 
equally applies to both generation investment and grid investment. However, due to the 
specific characteristics of the two areas, the respective concrete problems and solutions 
differ significantly. Regarding generation investments, the costs of new OWF can be 
significantly reduced with an adequate institutional framework in place, which properly 
allocates decisional responsibilities and risks between generators and the regulator. 
Moreover, international cooperation on generation projects promises cost savings, but 
certain obstacles have to be overcome in this context. On the transmission grid’s side, 
OWE development is also associated with large investment costs, as OWF have to be 
connected to the main grid. In a future with large OWE capacity, more integrated grid 
architectures could be introduced, replacing the traditional approach of radial connections 
and thereby coupling interconnection and connection infrastructures, while enabling 
market interlinkage, cross-border energy exchange and cross-border balancing activities. 
Against this background, this report compares different options for the institutional/ 
regulatory framework for OWE expansion with respect to both generation investments 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
1 Cf. IRENA, “Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2017,” International Renewable Energy Agency, Abu Dhabi., 2018. 
Available at: https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2018/Jan/IRENA_2017_Power_Costs_2018.pdf. 
2 However, other forms of spatial conflicts and negative externalities appear in the case of OWE. 
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(section 2) and grid investments (section 3). The analysis has a special focus on 
cooperative approaches, such as joint generation projects and meshed transmission grid 
solutions. The considerations outlined in this report represent condensed versions of the 
contents of three research papers created within the framework of the Baltic InteGrid 
project.3  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
3 Bibliographic information on the three research papers is provided at the beginning of the following sections. The research 
papers all extensively incorporate and refer to existing literature on the respective topics. For simplicity, the references are 
not replicated in this report. 
  
 
4  
 
 
2. Institutional framework for the development of 
offshore wind power projects (IKEM) 
Energy policy plans in Europe intend a large-scale deployment of OWE installations. 
Meanwhile, the conditions for implementing the expansion plans vary from country to 
country.4 The national institutional frameworks for OWE investment differ considerably, 
with decisional responsibilities and risks heterogeneously distributed between investors 
and regulators. As the costs of investment and operation highly depend on the market 
design, identifying the most cost-efficient solutions is thus crucial to enabling OWE 
deployment. Two main conceptual models of generation investment frameworks are 
discussed; the Energy-only Market (EOM) and the Capacity Remuneration Mechanism 
(CRM). In practice, when countries have ambitious environmental targets, even 
apparently EOM-based regimes usually feature targeted RES-E support instruments 
(which, as we will show below, are often based on the core ideas of the CRM approach). 
However, some contributors to the public debate propose phasing out such schemes as 
soon as possible and recommend to use the EOM as the principal if not sole mechanism for 
the provision of any kind of generation capacity. This view is highly disputable when basic 
economic considerations are taken into account. A main goal of the analysis presented in 
this section is to substantiate the reasons for the advantageousness of targeted OWE 
instruments. Secondly, we aim at delivering contributions to the debate on OWE 
instrument design. With these goals in mind, we outline general considerations on the 
performance of the two basic institutional framework models (section 2.1). Afterwards, 
we provide an overview of selected OWE remuneration schemes and procurement 
mechanisms (section 2.2), before concluding with a summary and policy implications 
(section 2.3). 
2.1 Pure EOM approach vs. targeted RES-E instruments 
In the EOM model, generators sell electricity through direct marketing and receive 
remuneration payments based on the market price, which fluctuates according to the laws 
of supply and demand. The EOM model reveals multiple potential problems which are 
largely related to the existence of transaction costs, impeding the coordination of market 
actors: Revenue uncertainty for investors leads to structurally high costs of capital. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
4 The main text of section 2 is based on Albert Hoffrichter, Thorsten Beckers, and Ralf Ott, “Institutional Framework for the 
Development of Offshore Wind Power Projects − Key Aspects for Instrument Choice and Design from an Institutional 
Economic Perspective,” Research Paper, 2018. 
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Uncoordinated investment decisions are likely to result in excesses or shortfalls in target 
capacities (with shortage occurrences amplified by the market uncertainty). Socially 
desirable production technology choices are impeded by the fact that investors are, on the 
one hand, often not able to appropriate all positive welfare effects, while, on the other 
hand, not being confronted with all social costs. The pricing mechanism of the EOM does 
not consistently steer investor revenues to risk-adequate levels. The amount of achievable 
contribution margins is therefore likely to be insufficient for some investors and excessive 
for others. In general, supplementary regulatory measures (which require centralised 
planning) could effectively address some of the problems. However, they are often barely 
compatible with the fundamental ideas of the EOM approach. Considering all these 
aspects, the EOM approach is unlikely to provide an appropriate framework for OWE 
investment. 
Concerning the CRM model, first of all it is important to mention that the public debate on 
the CRM concept typically refers to comprehensive mechanisms for all plants of the 
electricity system. By contrast, our considerations relate to the fundamental idea of the 
CRM approach, which – applied to the provision of OWE − can be summarised as follows: 
Generators are rewarded for implementing public decisions to build and operate OWE 
plants; investors are exposed to market risks to a certain degree only (in order to create 
efficiency incentives). This definition comprises a broad category of instruments, explicitly 
including targeted RES-E instruments which exhibit the described core elements of the 
CRM concept. The payments to generators may take many forms, such as fixed tariffs or 
sliding premiums (see section 2.2). 
RES-E instruments offer a potential to reduce generation cost significantly compared to 
the pure EOM model. The extent of realised cost savings largely depends on the regulator’s 
knowledge of the electricity system and instrument design choices. Since the 
appropriateness of the institutional framework for generation investments highly depends 
on the characteristics of each generation technology, adapting the design of RES-E 
instruments to the attributes of the respective technologies promises substantial 
advantages. In the case of OWE investments especially the following aspects should be 
considered: OWE projects are very large, both in terms of generation capacities and 
financial volumes. Planning periods as well as development periods are typically long. 
Usually regulators are necessarily involved in the choice of plant sites and must take 
multiple restrictions into account (e.g., maritime spatial planning considerations). 
Furthermore, OWE projects normally go along with considerable grid investment needs. 
Therefore the coordination of generation capacity planning and grid extension decisions is 
exceptionally important; the benefits of integrated planning can be expected to be 
particularly high when meshed offshore grid solutions or other forms of international 
cooperation are taken into consideration (for an overview of questions in the context of 
international cooperation on offshore wind (OW) projects, see text box 1). Despite the 
centralisation of certain general investment decisions, regulatory OWE expansion plans 
should leave enough room for the incorporation of relevant information and know-how 
possessed by supply side actors. In this context it is important to establish an effective 
incentive system which aligns investor decisions with the social objectives. 
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2.2 Key instrument design questions 
RES-E instruments are composed of various design elements. Although each of them 
potentially plays a significant role for a regime’s functioning, we limit the following 
discussion to an overview of selected remuneration schemes and procurement 
mechanisms. 
2.2.1 Remuneration scheme: FIT, FMP and SMP 
As described above, RES-E instruments remunerate generators for implementing the 
regulator’s decisions to install (and operate) RES-E plants. Choosing an appropriate 
remuneration scheme for OWE investments is important for a large-scale deployment. In 
light of the high capital intensity of OWE investments (which is primarily related to the 
lack of fuel costs) the costs of capital are particularly important for the overall cost. 
Therefore there should be a special focus on the implications for risk allocation when it 
comes to market design choices.5 Whenever decisions to build new OWF have been made 
by the regulator, there are, in principle, good reasons for offering long-term contracts to 
the actors implementing them. With investors being able to rely on relatively predictable 
revenues, the costs of capital will be considerably lower than in a situation where 
amortisation highly depends on future market developments. In order to incentivise an 
efficient use of resources and the development and application of cost-saving innovations, 
it is usually reasonable that generators largely bear cost risks; moreover, this approach 
spares extensive regulatory monitoring. 
Remuneration payments can generally be linked to the installed capacity, to electricity 
volumes provided or to the corresponding production values. In the case of OWE, 
electricity volumes seem to be a suitable criterion for calculating remuneration payments, 
as it sets incentives to investors to adapt plant designs to local conditions in order to 
deliver high contributions to electricity supply. This implies that generators bear 
production quantity risks. However, since production volumes are comparatively well 
predictable, the incurred effects on the cost of capital can be expected to be outweighed in 
most cases by positive efficiency effects of the incentives. In the following we discuss three 
common RES-E remunerations schemes which refer to electricity volumes: feed-in tariffs 
(FIT), fixed market premiums (FMP) and sliding market premiums (SMP). In each case, the 
level of payments can either be determined administratively (i.e., by the regulator) or by 
means of a competitive process which involves the supply side actors. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
5 OWE investments are furthermore highly specific, which means that once resources are deployed in the course of planning 
and implementing projects, they can largely be considered as sunk costs. Abandoning projects usually results in 
considerable stranded investments. 
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In the feed-in tariffs scheme, generators receive fixed payments per unit of electricity 
they provide. In order to limit consumer payments, the tariffs should ideally reflect the 
LCOE, including adequate returns for investors. Even if market prices rise above FIT levels, 
consumer payments remain stable. If possible curtailments (due to oversupply of 
electricity at a certain point in time) do not affect revenues, investors bear no market 
risks. FITs therefore have a high potential for limiting the costs of providing OWE capacity. 
Only focussing on production volumes, a potential downside of the FIT approach is that it 
provides incentives to maximise the mere quantity of the output. Sometimes, the OWF 
layout which promises the highest production volumes might not lead to the highest 
aggregate production values (for instance due to particularly intermittent production 
patterns). If this should be considered a relevant problem, it should be assessed whether 
investor decisions can be improved by modifying the incentive structure. One way of doing 
this is to confront investors with market risks, which is part of the feed-in premium 
instrument. 
With feed-in premiums in place, generators are typically responsible for selling 
electricity in exchange of market revenues. Additionally, they receive a premium on the 
production volume that can be fixed or sliding. 
When generators receive fixed market premiums, they bear full market risk. Compared 
to an EOM system (in which generators only receive market earnings), the risk’s impact on 
the cost of capital is reduced due to higher overall revenues. Nevertheless, costs of capital 
in a FMP scheme will typically be significantly higher than in a FIT system.6 Moreover, 
there is usually no revenue limitation in situations of high market prices, which can lead to 
excessive consumer payments. A reduction of payments in such situations would be 
conceivable, but withholding the investors’ upside risk when they still bear the downside 
risk seems to contradict the idea of the FMP. Therefore the overall consumer payments in 
an FMP scheme are likely to exceed FIT levels. Regarding the OWF layout and achievable 
production values, there are no clear indications that bearing full market risk leads to 
substantially improved investor decisions; high uncertainty regarding future market price 
structures makes significant impacts on investment decisions rather unlikely.7 Hence, in 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
6 Very high market premiums theoretically render market risks irrelevant for the costs of capital, but at the same time they 
substantially decrease efficiency incentives, while leading to exceptionally high consumer payments. 
7 Market price risks should only be allocated to generators, if the following conditions are met: i) Certain OWF design 
concepts increase both the production value and cost; ii) relevant value and cost differences are not known to the regulator; 
iii) market prices and production values are closely correlated; iv) future market price developments are sufficiently 
predictable for investors over the relevant period of operation to opt for technical concepts which promise higher revenues 
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light of the high costs of capital, it is hard to image that FMP schemes may lead to an 
efficient large-scale OWE deployment.8 
Sliding market premiums can be regarded as a hybrid of FMPs and FITs. Similar to the 
FMP approach, generators receive premiums on top of their market earnings. However, as 
suggested by the name, SMP levels vary over time, representing the difference between 
the FIT level − which serves as a benchmark − and the average market price achieved by 
plants of the respective generation technology (in our case OWE) in a certain period. 
Accordingly, a generator’s overall revenues equal the amount of payments in a FIT system 
when the weighted average of achieved market prices corresponds to the industry 
average. If individually achieved market prices exceed or fall short of the average in a 
certain period, the revenues diverge from the FIT level. This means that investors bear 
risk related to the correlation of their plants’ availability for production with the 
availability of other OWE plants and with market prices. SMPs therefore generally also 
provide incentives to maximise market revenues (i.e., output quantities and production 
values). However, the significance of the incentives for investment decisions is even more 
questionable than in the case of FMPs. Apart from the general difficulty of forecasting 
market price patterns over the lifespan of power plants, the flexibility of the premium 
level reduces revenue implications. Occasional significant deviations from the FIT level 
tend to balance out over the long-term contract periods. Nevertheless, it cannot be entirely 
ruled out that future changes in plant construction trends lead to substantially different 
production patterns of other OWE generation. Therefore technical progress and 
investment decisions of competitors lead to certain revenue risks which potentially affect 
the costs of capital. Still, the sliding premium overall effect on risk premiums can be 
expected to be comparatively small. Against this background, there are also good reasons 
for establishing a cap to the possible market earnings of generators in an SMP scheme, if 
there is a reasonable likelihood that market prices could exceed the FIT level during the 
contract period.9 
As mentioned above, in market premium schemes generators are usually responsible for 
selling electricity (whereas this is normally not the case in FIT regimes) and thus 
balancing. Whether direct marketing itself goes along with efficiency increases – as 
suggested by some contributions to the market design debate − has not yet been 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
at the expense of increased investment costs. Under such circumstances, exposing investors to market risks potentially leads 
to improved decisions and more efficient outcomes. 
8 Similar problems occur when other remuneration schemes and RES-E instruments that expose investors to high market 
risks (such as renewable obligations) are applied. 
9 Otherwise consumer payments will increase in case of high market prices which is questionable in light of the great 
limitations to the downside risks borne by investors. 
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demonstrated. On the other hand, due to large sizes of OWE projects cost increases related 
to decentralised marketing (by each generator) can be expected to be moderate in 
comparison with other RES-E technologies. It could be further argued that balancing 
responsibilities (and market risk) incentivise OWE generators to provide flexible back-up 
capacity. However, it is not evident why this task should be assigned to exactly these 
actors at expense of OWE projects cost of capital. The need for flexible capacity is 
determined by the overall intermittent capacity in the electricity system. Urging individual 
generators to deliver capacity on their own might therefore result in inefficient small-scale 
solutions with economies of scale not being realised. 
The assessment of remuneration schemes for OWE investments (which was presented 
here in condensed form) suggests that FIT and sliding premiums, in principle, offer a 
high potential regarding the limitation of costs. In contrast, concepts which expose OWE 
investment to high market risks appear to go along with considerable cost increases from 
both a welfare perspective and a consumer perspective. 
2.2.2 Procurement mechanism 
Considering the special characteristics of OWE projects, tender mechanisms appear to 
offer a generally suitable procurement framework. As explained in section 2.1, there are 
often good reasons for regulatory decisions regarding the locations of new OWFs. Setting 
the price as the key bidding parameter may be a promising approach to identify and select 
the most efficient generators and projects whilst limiting producer rents and thus 
consumer payments. The large size of individual OWE projects goes along with a 
comparatively low number of offers and thus relatively low transaction costs related to 
the participation in tenders. Nevertheless, a sufficient level of competition is a 
precondition for attaining desirable tender results. Since large projects usually attract 
investors of a certain size, the typical tender problem of creating entry barriers for small 
investors appears less important in comparison to other RES-E technologies. 
In order to foster the development and application of major innovations, it could be 
reasonable that the selection of projects is not exclusively based on the offer price. Instead, 
the (future) value of technological evolutions should also be taken into account. 
Adequately weighing different criteria in a scoring mechanism for project selection might 
sometimes prove very difficult and thus lead to undesirable outcomes. Alternatively, the 
regulator can define separated procurement segments for innovative projects in which the 
offers do not compete against regular projects. 
Although tendering new capacity does not necessarily involve deployment targets for 
many years ahead, it can be combined with regulatory commitments. Longer-term 
calculability is particularly important to OWE supply side actors, because large project 
sizes lead to step fixed costs at several stages of the supply chain. Therefore reliable 
trajectories for OWE expansion are essential for realising further cost reductions. 
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2.3 Summary and policy implications 
The general considerations on the EOM and the CRM presented above by no means imply 
that in real-life electricity systems which apply an EOM-based approach a sudden 
transition to a comprehensive CRM scheme (for all generation technologies) would always 
be recommendable, since the particular circumstances of each situation play a crucial role. 
Instead, we come to the conclusion that it is reasonable to use targeted instruments for the 
provision of OWE capacity whenever an expansion of the installed capacity is intended; 
this explicitly also applies to situations in which OWE would be competitive in an EOM-
based system as well.10 
Regarding the design of the OWE instrument, especially in countries with ambitious 
expansion targets it could be reasonable that, in a first step, the regulator chooses the 
locations for new OWE installations and carries out basic development tasks. In this way 
synergies with grid connection planning can be realised and the amount of stranded 
investments related to abandoned generation projects can be limited. The site exploration 
is followed by a tender process which serves for selecting generators (and potentially 
their project proposals) as well as determining the corresponding levels of remuneration 
payments. With respect to the remuneration scheme, FIT or SMP regimes can generally 
both be regarded suitable for OWE projects, because the costs of capital are comparatively 
low. 
In several EU member states the currently applied practices generally conform to these 
results. Meanwhile, other countries with serious interests in the development of OWE 
capacities should consider introducing similar targeted OWE regimes in order to create a 
reliable investment environment for generators who put the expansion plans into practice. 
However, concerning the implementation of theoretically sensible reforms of existing 
institutional frameworks, it is important to take their practical feasibility into account. In 
some cases it might not be possible to implement reform models without substantial 
modifications during the legislative process which drastically change the effects regarding 
the initially aspired goals. Besides, a certain degree of consistency and predictability in 
regulatory action is an elementary component of investment-friendly institutional 
frameworks. For this reason, care should be taken to avoid extensive devaluations of 
specific investments in the course of sudden paradigm shifts. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
10 Against this background, the expression ”support instruments” might be a suitable term for describing that the regulator 
promotes the development of RES-E technologies, if their costs and benefits are not appropriately reflected in the pricing 
mechanisms of the currently applied (EOM-based) market design. On the other hand, the term could be misleading, because 
the reasons for applying targeted instruments for the provision of RES-E plants (especially cost efficiency effects) do not 
disappear when a technology has reached a high level of competitiveness.  
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Sharing the costs and benefits: International cooperation on developing offshore 
wind generation capacity11 
Two important factors for driving down OWE costs are technological progress and 
gained experience. Besides that, cost savings could also arise from international 
collaboration. One method of cooperation is the joint realisation of OWE projects. 
Although private actors usually play a very important role in developing OWE 
projects, for the following considerations we assume a greatly simplified setting in 
which public actors (hereinafter often referred to as “countries”) develop OWE 
projects in order to reach certain national expansion targets.  Assuming this setting, 
joint projects mean that two or more states engage in the common planning and 
implementation of OWE plants. Such an approach generally makes it possible to select 
OWE production sites exclusively based on cost aspects and regardless of national 
borders. This promises LCOE decreases and thus potentially overall welfare gains. 
Moreover, potential synergies arise in the context of planning (meshed) offshore grids 
and interconnectors; among other things, hybrid grid concepts which combine linking 
OWFs to the main grid with the extension of cross-border transmission capacities play 
a role in this context. 
Despite the theoretical savings potential of joint projects, their implementation can be 
difficult. A main barrier is that joint projects often go along with complex cost and 
benefit effects which are usually not distributed equally among the participating 
countries (i.e., rent distribution might be unfavourable for some). In general, these 
problems could be tackled by adding further contractual arrangements regarding cost 
distribution. This, however, requires the determination of potential effects associated 
with the joint project. Since the effects they result from a large variety of complex 
interdependencies within the power systems, which continuously change over the 
course of a project’s lifetime, this task might already go along with considerable 
transaction costs. The same applies to negotiations and the management of the 
cooperation contracts. Besides, contracts entered into by investors for the 
development of joint projects are always incomplete due to the large variety of 
possible scenarios and may therefore leave the contracting parties with considerable 
uncertainty. 
A successful implementation of a joint project is most likely when achievable LCOE 
savings are high and transaction costs moderate, which is particularly likely, if there is 
a conducive transaction atmosphere between the countries; in other words, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
11 The content of this text box sums up key aspects of the analysis in Albert Hoffrichter and Thorsten Beckers, “International 
Cooperation on the Expansion of Offshore Wind Generation Capacity − Potential Benefits and Pitfalls of Joint Projects from 
an Institutional Economic Perspective,” Research Paper, 2018. 
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transaction costs should not offset the potential gains arising from cooperation. If 
countries are already involved in other cooperative projects, reaching an agreement 
tends to be easier and further synergies might arise. 
Supranational institutions can play an important role in overcoming obstacles to the 
realisation of joint projects. They can provide platforms and frameworks for 
cooperation in order to reduce the costs of individual transactions since general 
standards can be applied. Moreover, they can directly involve themselves in OWE 
cooperation initiatives and assist in the determination of effects or help countries 
reach agreements. They can act as a neutral institution to resolve conflicts during 
contract periods and reduce costs related to the design, negotiation, and 
reinforcement of cooperation contracts. Additionally they can provide financial 
support out of centralised funds for welfare enhancing joint projects in order to 
increase the attractiveness for the involved parties or overcome possible financing 
gaps; besides, such funding might reduce the costs of capital. However, not all 
measures taken by supranational institutions which are intended to foster 
cooperation are likely to reduce costs. In particular, virtually forcing countries into 
agreements could lead to the realisation of joint projects that are unfavourable for 
some actors or even overall; final decisions should therefore be left to the countries. 
The EU, in general, provides a comprehensive framework for international 
cooperation. Many existing European institutions with ruling competencies can, in 
principle, help to resolve conflicts that arise during the contracting period of joint 
projects. Several EU institutions also specifically offer support to collaboration 
initiatives which arise on a decentralised level; however, the programmes do not 
apply to “regular” power generation projects, including joint OWE projects. Regarding 
the financial support of projects in the electricity sector a variety of programmes with 
different selection procedures exist. Grid extensions are supported, for instance, when 
large positive effects on the interconnected power system emerge, whereas 
generation projects only receive direct payments from centralised funds when 
particularly innovative aspects are involved. The restraint in funding generation 
projects is reflecting the EU’s internal market goals regarding power generation. 
Instruments available for OWE projects are loans and other financial instruments 
provided by the European Investment Bank, which also advises on administration and 
development questions. There are no binding requirements for EU countries to 
implement joint generation projects. Instead, Member States are pushed to open 
national RES-E support schemes to plants located abroad, which seems questionable 
for similar reasons; the same applies to the increased pressure on countries to modify 
their national support schemes in order to comply with centrally established 
standards that aim at enhancing competition within the EU. 
Text box 1: International cooperation on developing offshore wind capacities.  
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3. Institutional framework for the development of 
(meshed) offshore wind grid infrastructures (DTU) 
Meshed grids solutions combine both cross-border transmission and offshore windfarms 
connections.12 They consist of integrated, dual-purpose and multi-actor projects, in the 
sense that they enable the exchange of electricity through interconnections and connect 
the OWF and can involve more than two actors (for instance several TSOs and OW 
operators). They open untapped possibilities for future decarbonised systems but also call 
for intensive adjustments in current regulatory frameworks. 
3.1 Offshore meshed transmission grids: A new option for future European 
networks 
An expansion of OWE capacity must be accompanied by an expansion of grid capacities 
which explains why reaching a low carbon energy future is highly associated with 
large network investments. In order to reach European decarbonisation targets, it is 
expected that future investments in transmission grids will reach EUR 125 to 140 billion 
until 2030, and up to 420 billion until 2050. However, according to energy experts, only 
half of this investment is expected to be made due to the inadequacy of current 
regulatory frameworks.13 
It is the combination of ambitious RES-E development goals and the transmission network 
investment challenge that supports the emergence of hybrid architectures such as meshed 
grids. 
Offshore meshed grids open an array of new opportunities to OW operators, TSOs and 
the rest of the society. They present extensive benefits in terms of economic and 
environmental efficiency as well as in terms of reliability as compared to traditional 
uncoupled connection and interconnection architectures. The integration of OWF to 
interconnectors generates synergies and cost savings in improving the utilisation factor of 
network capacities and increasing the value of the electricity produced. Offshore meshed 
grids also strengthen market coupling with positive effects in terms of price convergence 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
12 Section 3 contains a summary of Claire Bergaentzlé and Lise-Lotte Pade, “Regulatory barriers to offshore meshed grids: A 
TSO perspective illustrated with the Baltic Sea countries”, Working Paper, 2018. 
13 Henriot, Arthur. 2013. “Financing Investment in the European Electricity Transmission Network: Consequences on Long-
Term Sustainability of the TSOs Financial Structure.” Energy Policy 62. Elsevier, pp. 821–29. 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2013.07.011, p. 882. 
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and competition. They give access to more diverse energy mix therefore reducing the need 
for additional reserve capacities and strengthening systems reliability. Offshore meshed 
grids are expected to lower curtailments and are consistent with national long-term 
capacity adequacy and interconnection plans. Future developments of offshore meshed 
grids should finally result in positive externalities in terms of CO2 emission reductions, 
faster energy transition; offshore wind energy market uptake; minimisation of support 
schemes and increased regional welfare. 
However, offshore meshed – and hybrid – grids development also face substantial 
regulatory challenges, mostly due to their capitalistic nature and of the involvement 
of multiple stakeholders. 
Offshore meshed grids result in higher upfront investment costs as compared to classical 
infrastructure, mainly driven by the use of HVDC technology and the multiplication of 
transformers. Economies of scale building on large installed capacities and sufficient grid 
infrastructure are consequently determinant in meshed grid projects to reach long term 
economic profitability, which also stresses the need for coordination and joint effort 
between the involved partners at the regional scale. 
While learning curves are expected on the technical-side to lower the investment 
constraints, important efforts are yet to be made to support short and long-term 
coordination in grid operation and investment. Currently, regulatory frameworks are 
unsuited to promote hybrid infrastructures. The multiplicity of stakeholders combined 
with different national regulatory interests makes meshed grid planning, development 
and operation challenging. The identification, and lifting-up, of key regulatory barriers 
then becomes critical prior engaging into future discussion into meshed grid development. 
More specifically, supportive regulatory framework conditions should create a level 
playing field in relation to cost allocation, risk sharing and financial incentives at the sea 
basin level. 
3.2 Regulatory framework 
The operational complexity, the need to reach a high degree of convergence in the 
planning and investment activities of meshed grids should shape the designs of suitable 
regulatory frameworks. 
The diversity in cost allocation approaches for OWF connection, of grid utilisation 
tariff s and in the regulatory regime associated with TSOs’ investments are 
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considered key regulatory barriers to offshore meshed grids as developed hereinafter. 14  
On the bright side, important efforts were made to harmonise practices in system 
operation that may bring about inspiring perspectives on how to promote coordination in 
multilateral infrastructure investment. 
3.2.1 Connection cost allocation 
TSOs are responsible for building the transmission grid infrastructure. The viability of OW 
projects is greatly influenced by the allocation of grid connection costs between the two 
stakeholders. The connection costs reflect the investment in new infrastructure assets to 
connect the OWF to the onshore grid and vary in function of the OWF capacity, distance to 
shore as well as the depth of the OWF location. OWF connection may also affect existing 
infrastructure and involve reinforcements of onshore assets. 
Several cost allocation models prevail, where TSOs, OWF developers or in some cases, 
third parties such as in the UK, participate to the investment effort, involving various 
degrees of financial risk for each stakeholder associated to the grid funding. For instance, 
in a super-shallow approach, the TSO (and the rate payers) almost entirely internalises the 
financial risk associated with network construction which precisely supports OW 
development initiatives. In contrast, a deep approach adds on the financial risk borne by 
the OW developer and will ultimately reflect in the bidding strategy and competitiveness 
of the market actor. Models where OWF developers must bear part or all of the connection 
costs also send a locational signal that may potentially result in a trade-off between least-
cost location in terms of network development and optimal location in terms of wind 
condition. The resource-dependency of wind energy makes the deep connection method 
relatively unsuited in view of the uptake of efficient offshore wind production. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
14 Other regulatory barriers may be for example complicated administrative procedures for project planning or different 
legal “interpretation” of grid assets status such as the legal status of dual-purpose cables.  
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Figure 1: Cost allocation for grid construction. 
In a meshed grid architecture involving several TSOs, connection cost allocation models 
are critical both in relation with the kind of signal that is sent (level of risky) and in the 
homogeneity of this signal within the area. 
In view of the development of an optimised meshed grid for the development of offshore 
wind power, a super-shallow approach where only TSOs bear the costs associated with 
grid development is preferable. This approach de facto eliminates locational signals, thus 
limiting potential distortions in investment decision from the OW operator.  Measures to 
outweigh the potential over cost impact due to the lack of locational signals should 
nevertheless be introduced to mitigate grid expenditures. The main question to address is 
how to share cost among the involved TSOs. The Economics viewpoint in relation to 
cost allocation advocates investment burden should be proportionate to the effective 
benefits expected from the infrastructure, potentially reducing the grid development 
burden for individual operators. In a multi-actors network, cost-reflectiveness criteria can 
however be uneasy to capture, making connection cost sharing blurry. In that respect, the 
cross-border cost allocation (CBCA) initiative from ACER and the ENTSO-E to apportion 
costs in projects of common interests consists of a possible line of approach in an offshore 
meshed grid context since it captures multilateral investments constraints and accounts 
for externalities.  
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3.2.2 Tariff design and utilisation of the network 
The grid access charge, or tariff, reflects the cost to utilise the grid infrastructure and is 
paid by grid users (generators and end-consumers15). The superposition of different tariffs 
may be a barrier to joint projects as different fees may be charged by the involved TSOs, 
resulting in uneven incentives to connect to and to feed in the meshed grid. 
Three main factors that directly relate to the tariff design have to be considered.The level 
of the tariff paid respectively by generators and consumers should be harmonised. Usually, 
the contribution of generators to network utilisation (the G-charge) is null, such as in the 
three Baltic countries, Germany and Poland, or limited, such as in Denmark.  A handful of 
countries apportion the access charge in a way to even out to some extent the charges paid 
by both party (the G-charge in Finland and Sweden goes from 19 to 36%). Harmonisation 
should also be addressed in the structure of the access fee, that is, in the allocation in the 
access charge between energy and capacity component. In Denmark the access charge 
structure is entirely based on the energy charge, meaning that for each unit of energy 
generated, a network fee is paid. Sweden and Finland apply a capacity-based charge on top 
of the energy charge. While the energy component adds a fee for each unit of electricity fed 
in the network, the capacity charge is paid per period, regardless of the electricity 
produced, which discriminates generation units with a low load factors such as OWF. 
Some tariffs also include additional features such as a locational component. Similarly to 
the connection cost approaches, locational elements in the access charge would have the 
effect to discriminate resource-dependent generation units against traditional generation. 
In a meshed infrastructure system, it is necessary that grid access tariffs are harmonised 
to limit uneven business opportunities and operation costs for OW developers, with 
detrimental impact in terms of competition and LCOE. A common access charge should 
thus prevail to create a level playing field and prevent distortions at the offshore 
meshed grid level. 
A first step towards more harmonisation is brought by the ACER’s initiative which sets 
that access charges should reflect the network operating costs and should be set between 
0 and 0,5 EUR/MWh.16 However, this measure is still incomplete as some countries such 
as for example Denmark, Sweden or Finland are exempted from these regulations and can 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
15 According to EU rules, interconnectors are not subject to access charge; this is attributable to their status that is 
recognised neither as generation nor demand. 
16 Commission Regulation (EU) 838/2010 of 23 September 2010 on laying down guidelines relating to the inter-
transmission system operator compensation mechanism and a common regulatory approach to transmission charging. 
Official Journal of the European Union. 
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apply access charges up to 1,2 EUR/MWh. In addition, no guidance is provided on capacity 
charges or other costs features such as locational signals, which leaves substantial room 
for improvement in future tariff adjustments. 
3.3 Rate making: Zoom on the cost recovery of regulated expenses 
The investment challenges that lay ahead for European energy strategy question to some 
extent the suitability of dominant regimes and call for more flexibility in the funding of 
innovative technical and organisational solutions. Investments in grid infrastructure are 
performed by TSOs in response to binding legal obligations (for instance to achieve 
interconnection targets or connect renewable generation units) and to a set of regulatory 
incentives. The instrument package designed by the regulator should be used as a tool to 
drive capital and operation expenses and to facilitate cooperation among TSOs. Based on 
the design and combination of the incentive instruments and the particular item of 
expenditure they apply to, the investment risk and degree of effort expected from the TSOs 
to perform according to predefined criteria may differ significantly. 
A sound regulatory regime for rate making should strike a balance between risk 
minimisation in a very limited information environment associated with capital intensive 
innovative investment in a multiplayers context. An offshore meshed grid-friendly 
regulatory regime should be designed according to the characteristics of such investment 
that can be summarised as being: capitalistic; meaning that covering the investment risk 
should be prioritised while maintaining the overall expenditure low; Innovative; meaning 
that low information is known from both parties (the regulator and the TSO); Unlocks 
efficiency gains; meaning that the capture and measurability of such gains can be used as 
trigger for the investment; And encompasses national boundaries; meaning that 
coordination in investments and incentives should be reached at the regional level. 
Current regulatory regimes are however inherited from periods characterised by over-
capacity in infrastructure assets when the main objective for regulatory agencies was to 
incentivise cost cuttings. They are therefore limited to incentivise offshore meshed grid 
investment and generally speaking are outdated to instigate investment booms at a least 
cost. The investment challenge that lays ahead meshed grids thereby questions the 
suitability of dominant regimes and calls for more flexibility in the funding of 
innovative solutions. Incentive instruments exist to address each of these features. 
For example, the UK extended its regulatory period to allow grid operators to reduce the 
financial risk associated with the heavy investments expected to comply with British 
decarbonisation effort. Germany operates a clear distinction between controllable and 
non-controllable capital expenditures and applies different sets of incentives depending 
on the expected cost efficiency grid operators can reach. In California a new set of metrics 
was developed to couple profit with new performance objectives associated to smart grids 
development. Similar performance-based indicators could be constructed to associate 
offshore meshed grids benefits to the TSOs’ profit. 
However, what is missing is a coherent regime offering a combination of the best 
incentive instruments to trigger investments in offshore meshed grids, and the 
institutional framework that precedes the establishment of a coherent regime 
across borders. 
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3.4 Towards harmonised system operation 
In addition to a greater convergence in the applicable rules for capital investment, a high 
level of coordination for the short-term operation of offshore meshed grids is needed. The 
lack of harmonisation in network operation activities limits cross-border electricity 
exchanges17, including through offshore meshed grids, and more generally limits the 
integration of RES.  A review of recent initiatives taken at the European level indicates that 
important efforts have been accomplished to improve short-time operation. This is the 
result of a progressive adoption of common operation rules and network codes that have 
paved the way for more interoperability and harmonised balancing mechanisms across 
transmission zones. Because the operation of offshore meshed grid is intrinsically linked 
to security of supply in a highly variable generation context, these initiatives are 
considered supportive regulatory frameworks. 
The European Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/ 2195 sets a framework for cross-
border balancing where TSOs are expected to cooperate closely to develop monitoring and 
calculation methods pursuant to the Electricity Regulation and are drafted to address 
cross-border network and market integration. The main argument for the network codes 
is to create an institutional framework that facilitates dialogue in trans-national projects. 
The joint calculation of available cross-border capacity is part of the thematic addressed in 
the codes and gives an illustrative example on how this framework supports integrated 
activities and can alleviate barriers to future meshed grids. 
Today, capacity calculation is made by sub-regions. In the Baltic Sea basin, three different 
sub-regions co-exist (Nordics, Baltic and Hansa). Countries such as Sweden for instance 
belong to the three sub-regions. In a meshed infrastructure, it becomes necessary to define 
to which region the interconnectors belong to for capacity calculation. The network codes, 
without fixing a given rule, limit the possible alternatives. Because they are developed in 
the perspective of reaching future interconnection and RES-E development targets, the 
underlying foundation of the codes is expected to be consistent with meshed architectures. 
On top of enhancing coordination in operation activities, significant efforts are also 
currently deployed to promote harmonisation in the market activities performed by the 
TSOs in relation to balancing services. Currently, a myriad of balancing market designs co-
exist in Europe (For a review see the ENTSO-E survey18). The Network Code on Electricity 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
17 Friends of the Supergrid, 2010, Position paper on the EC Communication for a European Infrastructure Package, p. 15. 
18 Entso-e. 2017, “Survey on Ancillary Services Procurement, Balancingmarket Design 2016”. 
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Balancing (NC EB)19 has recently set the legislative guidelines for European TSOs to 
develop common principles for the harmonisation of balancing energy services.20 Final 
authorised propositions should be enforced in 2019. The aim of this regulation is to 
develop cross-border European platforms based on a multilateral TSO-TSO model using 
common governance principles ensuring non-discrimination. 
The guidelines are consistent with meshed grids as they address the variability from wind 
energy. In that sense, it increases the value of wind energy and the market profitability of 
meshed grid infrastructure. Besides, they promote harmonisation in future exchanges of 
ancillary services across borders, which is crucial in meshed architectures. However, a 
comparison between the guidelines and current balancing markets design tends to show 
that the effective implementation of the guidelines may be more burdensome in some 
countries than in others.21 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
19 Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/2195 of 23 November 2017 establishing a guideline on electricity balancing, OJ L 312, 
28.11.2017, p. 6–53. 
20 Art. 19-21 NC EB.  
21 For instance, the Nordic countries may have to make more adjustments in the design of the automatic frequency 
restoration reserve while continental Europe may have more difficulties in complying with the settlement mechanism 
associated with manual frequency restoration reserve. 
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4. Conclusion 
In light of drastic LCOE reductions in recent years and large reductions in the context of 
gained experience and technical progress yet to be realised, OWE has the potential to play 
a key role in future energy systems. Although especially new OW projects have already 
proven the technology’s competitiveness, the costs of OWE are sometimes still perceived 
to be comparatively high. One of the main reasons leading to this perception is that 
national regulatory frameworks often do not provide an adequate environment for OW 
investment which results in substantial cost increases. Recognising the importance of the 
institutional framework and making adaptions if considered necessary is therefore 
essential for realising the technology’s potential. Presenting the analyses of three 
comprehensive working papers, in this report we discussed the importance of the 
regulatory framework for the expansion of OWE capacities with respect to both 
generation investment and grid investment. 
Regarding generation investment, a large number of aspects deliver strong arguments for 
applying technology-specific instruments rather than relying solely on market 
mechanisms. With great uncertainty about future developments and limited hedging 
possibilities, the cost of OW investment in EOM-based market environments would be 
unnecessarily high and it is questionable whether a large-scale OWE deployment would 
take place. A purpose-oriented distribution of decisional responsibilities and risks 
between generators and the regulator (i.e., the consumers) can be established in the 
context of targeted OW regimes which provide long-term contracts for generators who 
implement public decisions to increase OW capacities. The higher the regulator’s 
knowledge on power markets and instrument design, the better the instrument design can 
be adapted to the prevailing conditions. In many cases it could be reasonable to centralise 
the selection (or at least preselection) of production sites and to put out contracts for 
building and operating OWFs in these locations to competitive tender. Remuneration 
payments for the selected generators could be based on the FIT approach or the SMP 
approach, which both allow for comparatively low costs of capital. The selection of 
suppliers and the determination of payment levels could be based on the offers received in 
the tender. Ideally, this leads to selecting the most efficient projects and generators, while 
avoiding excessive producer rents. However, aspects apart from the offer price should also 
be taken into account. With respect to long-term efficiency it is, for instance, very 
important that the regulator actively enables the development and application of 
innovative OWE concepts. Last but not least, due to high step fixed costs at several stages 
of the OW supply chain, regulatory commitments to reliable trajectories for the expansion 
of OW capacities represent another source of significant cost reductions. 
Concerning the regulation of offshore grid investment, providing a framework which 
promotes the implementation of meshed or integrated grid architectures (instead of radial 
connections) is a key challenge. Meshed grid infrastructures span over various regulatory 
jurisdictions governed by different regimes and institutional architectures. The difficulty 
in developing an adequate regulatory framework lies in the hybrid nature of the 
infrastructure, which encompasses both dual-purpose and multilateral dimensions. With 
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such an architecture, the general acceptation of a legal definition for the transmission 
asset is critical as it will directly affect the design for regulatory frameworks. For example, 
if a given asset is recognised as an interconnector, this definition automatically entails that 
the TSO (or an independent third-part actor) is responsible for all development aspects. If 
the same asset is legally considered part of the transmission network, investment burdens 
can be allocated between the national TSO and relevant stakeholders such as OW 
operators, in which case the respective responsibilities for developments between 
stakeholders will depend on the national jurisdiction the asset belongs to. Currently, 
transmission grid development occurs in regulatory set-ups developed to achieve national 
interests (rather than overall welfare benefits), thereby offering limited perspectives on 
offshore meshed grid development. Success in future offshore meshed grid development 
requires that adjustments are made to current frameworks. More specifically, offshore 
meshed grid projects call for enhanced cooperation at the regional scale, better project 
integration between OW connections and interconnectors, as well as harmonisation in 
investment efforts and system operation. Regulations should therefore promote regional 
harmonisation in order to create similar conditions for investments in and operation of 
grid assets. Continuous efforts are being made at the European level to create suitable 
institutional frameworks for the actors concerned that include common methodologies 
and rules to enhance system operation efficiencies. They represent important steps 
towards the coordinated operation of hybrid network infrastructures in the future. 
However, as far as network capital investments are concerned, similar initiatives and 
harmonisation efforts are still lacking. 
The prevalence of national-based methodologies for OW connection cost sharing, 
calculating grid access tariffs and setting financial incentives in the regulatory regimes 
creates uneven risks for both TSOs and OW developers that are likely to result in 
distortions in the development choices made by the involved stakeholders. Regulation 
should therefore address the barriers that prevent the involved actors from facing similar 
investment risk. 
Using a single set of approaches for infrastructure cost allocation at the meshed grid scale 
seems unavoidable to support unbiased development.  A cost distribution method based 
on the “who benefits pays” approach is difficult to implement due to the hybrid nature of 
the infrastructure that blurs the direct relationship between investment and expected 
benefits. Assuming that promoting OW development is an underlying objective of cost 
allocation, a supportive framework should avoid locational signals sent to the OW 
developers (such as in a deep approach) and let the financial risks be borne by the TSOs 
and the society. Grid utilisation tariffs based on consistent, if not commonly shared, tariff 
structures should also avoid locational signals and respond to cost-reflectiveness 
principles, advocating that OW operators pay for their use-of-system cost in time. Finally – 
similar to the case of generation investments − reliable long-term RES connection and 
interconnection goals, backed by appropriate and consistent regulatory regimes and 
increased coordination across regulatory agencies, reduce the investment risk for capital 
intensive grid assets. 
